Weakness of Will
Encountering Philosophy, Chapter 23
Travis Joseph Rodgers
"…Leontius, son of Aglaion, returning from the Piraeus outside the northern wall, perceiving dead bodies lying at the public execution place at once was desiring to see them and being disgusted and turning away from them; for a time he struggled and covered his face, resisting; then through desire he opened his eyes wide, running forward to the corpses. "Look, you wretches," he said. "Get your fill of the fine spectacle!" (Plato’s Republic, 439e-440a, my translation).
Akrasia
Leontius seems to have experienced weakness of will in the above story from Plato’s Republic. Assuming this wasn’t a parapsychological compulsion, Leontius’s scenario is probably something you’re quite familiar with. We often judge that one course of action is superior to alternatives and yet “find ourselves” following another path. Perhaps Netflix asks you if you’re still watching. You judge it best to go to bed instead of watching another episode. Then you click “I’m still watching,” and carry on with the next episode.
This psychological phenomenon we call weakness of will. The Greeks, like Plato and Aristotle, called it akrasia. Kratos is a strength, and putting an alpha in front of the word makes it negative, so a+krasia is “lack of strength.” What exactly is going on in akratic action? What, in other words, is weakness of will?
If Alfred Mele (1987) is right, akrasia is (free) action contrary to one’s considered judgment. If this is an accurate account of what Leontius is doing, he has judged that he should not look at the body. Then he looks at the body. In fact, he may even intend to look at the body and intentionally look at the body. And he can do all this despite judging that he should not do it. That mismatch between his intentional behavior and his judgment would make the case akratic (weakness of will).
Backsliding
Another view that has received much attention in the weakness of will literature holds that central cases of weakness of will are instances in which the agent “backslides” (cf. Hare 1963). On Richard Holon’s view, this means that after they have formed a settled intention, they revise or abandon that intention. Of course, there are good reasons to abandon or revise an intention, so not all cases of revising or abandoning intentions will count as weakness of will. Suppose I hear a clamor outside my office door while I’m trying to write. I decide to tell the person to be more considerate. When I thrust open the door, I see a mountain of a man slamming a sledgehammer against the wall. I don’t tell him to be more considerate. Instead, I slink back into my office and hope he didn’t see me. That’s not weakness of will. That’s being sensible.
Complications and Controversies
It’s an open question whether one of these accounts is “the” or “the better” account of weakness of will. Some experimental data has at least cast doubt upon the claim that Holton has captured the view “of the folk” (Mele 2012). This was done by identifying a case that one theory would count as weakness of will that the other wouldn’t and asking regular folks (not philosophers) to rate whether they agree with the claim that the example shows weakness of will.
So, on one hand, these sorts of data might get at the “Oh, yeah?” or “What do you mean?” question of philosophy. What do people mean when they talk of weakness of will? Perhaps we can find widespread agreement among people about what they mean. If this is the case, then perhaps Holton has identified some other phenomenon, one that might be closely related to weakness of will even if it’s not weakness of will, in the common sense.
On the other hand, we might look toward answers to the “So, what?” question of philosophy. Why are we, both laypeople and philosophers, interested in weakness of will? It may be that in answering this sort of question, we come to see an advantage in one account of weakness of will over another. Is weakness of will irrational, for instance? If so, we might try to identify it so we can reduce it. Is weakness of will immoral? If so, then we’d have further reason to try to reduce it. But what if weakness of will is neither always irrational nor always immoral?
Strength of Will and Continence
Perhaps we are interested in weakness of will because we see a curious relation between two sorts of human control. What we might call system 1 is our human actions where we behave largely without self-criticism and heavy monitoring. We might call it colloquially unconscious or subconscious. We go about our day, we drive a car, we perform the quotidian work of our job. We suddenly look up and an hour has passed, or we’ve nearly arrived at our destination. And for the most part, we don’t do things catastrophically wrong. But sometimes we become aware of a decision point.
Perhaps it’s lunchtime and you didn’t bring your lunch, so you’re contemplating what to eat. You know there’s a fast-food joint next door that has cheap but very unhealthy food. Or you know there’s a healthier and more expensive option a block away. You feel System 1 pulling you next door, but you think that if you try, you can make yourself go to the healthier option. Your resistance comes via System 2. This is your ability to disrupt your patterns and exert conscious control.
One reason to care about weakness of will is to help us become, in Aristotelian (though not Aristotle’s) terms, continent. To be continent is to admit that we are flawed, will sometimes be led astray by our desires. It’s also to recognize that we can exert control and beat down, vanquish, or at least redirect our passions. We can’t reasonably expect people to be morally perfect, but we can ask them to try hard to not let their imperfections affect themselves and others.
Hare, R.M. 1963. Backsliding. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon.
Holton, Richard. 1995. Intention and weakness of will. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 96, 241-262.
Mele, Alfred. 1987. Irrationality: an essay on akrasia, self-deception, and self-control. OUP.
Mele, Alfred. 2012. Backsliding: Understanding weakness of will. Oxford. 145 pp.
I read this last night before going to bed and could not wait to respond on the weakness of will. Or I guess in some sense willpower. Between what one wants to will oneself to do v. what they actually end up doing. Now in your example of unhealthy food and healthy food. We know we ought to eat healthy but when we choose the unhealthy option there is immediate guilt. I should have had a better lunch than this, why do I suffer from a weakness of will. But if I willingly choose to eat unhealthy and I am happy/satisfied with that decision then that would not be considered a weakness of will. I think we can define a weakness of will when we regret, feel guilty, or are angry at our selves from "lacking" control.