Chapter 8: Happiness
Encountering Philosophy, the free online text
H is for Happiness
Travis Joseph Rodgers
What is the meaning of life? When someone asks this question, they typically aren’t asking for a definition of life. Rather, they’re asking what makes a life worth living. While there are many answers to this question, Aristotle pointed out that if we continue to ask someone, “Yes, but why do you want that?” we’d eventually arrive at an answer as uncontroversial as uninformative: I want to be happy. Philosophers will ask, “What is happiness?” I consider here six possible answers to that question.
Resources
We want stuff. Maybe you’re materialistic and you want to swim in a vat of money like Scrooge McDuck. Or maybe you’re interested in a simple home and “a small pot of cheese,” like Epictetus. Either way, you want resources. But does possessing stuff constitute happiness?
Aristotle offers a compelling criticism of the view that money is the goal of life. Unlike Scrooge, real people want money to use. They want to buy other things. They want safety and security. It seems resources are an important part of getting to happiness, but they’re not happiness itself. They are the means to an end.
Pleasure
At some point, most English speakers came to think of happiness as a feeling opposing sadness. Humans want pleasure. Most philosophers who write about happiness accept that pleasure is not itself bad, and it is probably among the good things. It’s just that there may be things worth doing that are not pleasant. Sacrificing ourselves for our loved ones is an example. There may also be things unworthy of pursuing, even if they give us pleasure. Suppose someone assaults weak people because they love hearing the cries of those weaker than them. Few would accept that this is an activity worth doing.
On the other hand, if we were told that the best life was devoid of pleasure, that would give us pause. We want many things in a good life. Resources and pleasure are two of those things, even if they’re not the full list of what we want. Perhaps there are only certain types of pleasures and resources worth pursuing. Or perhaps certain principles should regulate our pursuit of those things.
Honor
Some think that the goal of life is to receive respect from others. We could look to caricatures in men’s rights advocates who suggest that women and weaker men must submit to them. This position receives little support among philosophers. Even if it did, it would likely fall victim to a pointed criticism.
We do not control whether others honor us. We control only whether we are worthy of honor. If we need the approval of the very ones we wish to harm, we are their pawns. Similar things go for love and kindness. If the goal is to have these things, then we need others to “offer” them to us. What, then, could make us worthy of honor, love, or kindness?
Virtue
What do we call the state of being worthy of honor? Maybe being honorable. Being worthy of love? Lovable. In fact, the state of being worthy of praise generally is virtue. You are courageous, so you deserve praise. You are self-controlled, so you deserve praise. In short, the life of virtue seems to aim at being good rather than receiving the awards and rewards associated with such a life.
Aristotle identifies one problem with such a life. You could be virtuous but perhaps fail to do anything with your virtue. So, Aristotle identifies an active life of virtue as a better candidate. This means happiness is using your virtue. You use your courage to face dangers, wisdom to navigate uncertainties, and justice to right wrongs.
But Plato noted another problem with such a life. You can be virtuous and get nothing external from your virtue. Suppose, for instance, someone was truly virtuous but had a terrible reputation. Their reputation might make their life miserable. Their virtue might be hollow consolation. Plato argued that there were some things that a good (virtuous) person couldn’t fail to have, but they could be denied honor, resources, and some pleasures. They could even be tortured and killed after being saddled with a pathetic reputation in the eyes of the many.
Contemplation
Perhaps it is no surprise that a philosopher would call contemplation happiness. There is a stereotype of a philosopher lazing around, asking questions like, “What is truth, anyway?” Aristotle’s argument for the conclusion that happiness is contemplation seems to include three key claims. First, contemplation is something that we can engage in for far longer, in general, than we can vigorously engage in other virtuous actions. Second, happiness is something complete. Third, contemplation itself is itself virtuous. So, by living a life of reason – contemplating and, when appropriate, acting virtuously, one lives a happy life. So Aristotle suggests. Moreover, we can contemplate even when our body is in shackles. And contemplation is often pleasurable.
Blessedness
Immanuel Kant thought that the best kind of life was one we might call blessed. It combines moral virtue and the good fortune of satisfaction. Goodness is what we strive for, as in the life of virtue or contemplation. But we also want opportunities to gain from our goodness for two reasons. First, our goodness is a way to arrive at rewards. Even if it’s not the goal, people who are trustworthy, kind, courageous, and wise tend to be rewarded by others. They trust them; they turn to them in hard times. Second, we also want opportunities to put our goodness into action. This requires some resources. To be a good friend, you must have friends. To be courageous, you must have some ability to face danger. To engage in generous activities, you need resources. Blessedness combines these two lines. Alas, virtue and happiness are not good bedfellows. They will sometimes conflict. In such cases, Kant urges the life of moral rightness. Happiness be damned.